Recent empirical papers report a declining trend in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of acquirers during an M&A program. Does this necessarily imply that acquiring CEOs are infected by hubris and are not learning from previous mistakes? We first confirm the existence of this declining trend on average.
Recent empirical papers report a declining trend in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquiring firms during merger and acquisition (M&A) programs. Fuller et al. (2002) , analyzing 3,135 successful deals during the nineties in the US, report an average acquirer CAR of 2.74% for the first acquisition, declining to 0.52% for the fifth and successive acquisition. Similar results, some even more dramatic, are reported in Billett and Qian (2005) , Croci (2005) , Conn et al. (2005) , (for UK M&As), Ismail (2006) and Ahern (2006) . The question is no longer whether this phenomenon is real or robust. The empirical procedures in the above-cited papers are sound and we replicate similar results here. But how should this pattern be interpreted? Is the declining trend a sign of growing hubris with repetitive acquisitions, as is often alleged in these papers 1 ? Or could it be consistent with rational CEO learning?
The question is important. The management literature argues that acquirers can benefit greatly from learning (Hayward, 2002; Harding and Rovit, 2004) . Hayward (2002) even identifies the conditions allowing (organizational) learning: (i) deals not too close together nor too far apart in time, (ii) deals not too similar nor different in terms of businesses, and (iii) decision-makers with appropriate economic incentives. In the economic and finance literature also, there is a long tradition of considering learning as a key feature of decision making (see, inter alia, Grossman et al., 1977 , Zeira, 1987 Rob, 1991; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Bernardo and Chowdhry, 2002; Berk et al., 2004) . CEO decision makers who exhibit growing hubris contradict these ideas.
It would also raise doubt about the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms, which would seem unable to forestall value-destroying decisions and unable to select CEOs who act rationally in behalf of shareholders.
The direct impact of CEOs on the M&A decisions and their risk aversion are two stylized features examined in previous papers (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Cai and Vijh (forthcoming
Journal of Finance))
. Aktas et al. (2006) -ADR hereafter -derive a theoretical model of decision making for both rational and hubris-infected CEOs. In their formal analysis, the CEO has to value a potential acquisition before bidding. During this initial valuation stage, the CEO faces a tradeoff between over-evaluation, which could lead ex-post to disappointment and possible sanctions (such as dismissal), and under-valuation, which would make successful deal completion unlikely. Financial markets are assumed (semi-strong) efficient, and their reactions to successive deal announcements are signals sent to the CEO, who uses them to update his beliefs about potential synergies with targets. Hubris is defined as a form of cognitive bias, leading to over-estimated expected synergies (over-optimism) or to under-estimated synergy risk (overconfidence).
From the valuation tradeoff combined with learning and/or hubris, ADR draw implications about CEO bidding behavior and about ex-post observable prices, the announcement period CAR, and the time between successive deals (TBD). The theory delivers a set of empirically testable implications for rational and hubris infected CEOs. It implies that a declining CAR trend is NOT sufficient to imply growing hubris during M&A programs. Indeed, a declining CAR can be explained by several alternative phenomena (e.g., a shrinking investment opportunity set or increasing competition among acquirers in M&A waves). However, the combination of predictions about the CAR and the TBD is distinctly different for rational and hubris-infected
CEOs within the ADR theory.
In this paper, we subject the ADR theory to empirical test. Our aim is to describe the dominant traits of the US CEO decision makers during M&A programs and to test whether the empirical predictions developed in ADR are supported by the facts. We study a sample of 2,589 individual CEOs, spanning the 1992-2002 period. Among them, 1,235 have not made any acquisitions while 1,424 have made at least one. In the latter group, the average number of deals is 3.28, or 4,677 deals in total.
The key features of our empirical approach are: (i) as in Croci (2005) , we focus on CEOs and not on firms because we believe that CEOs play a central role in M&A decisions. Especially when dealing with hubris and learning, it seems sensible to focus on specific individual decision makers; (ii) we adapt our econometric methods to the natural panel structure of the data (tracking successive deals done by a given CEO); (iii) we investigate the determinants of the TBD, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence about this attribute of M&A programs; (iv) using a two-step procedure similar to Leschinskii and Zollo (2004) and Gaspar et al. (2005) , we explicitly control for potential endogenous sample selection biases.
Our first step is to corroborate the previously reported declining CAR pattern from deal to deal.
Then, using the ADR model's predictions, we provide a set of new results. Our univariate analyses show that (i) during M&A programs, CEOs, firms and deal profiles change (this is not necessarily a surprise but it verifies that repetitive acquirers are not the same as one time acquirers); (ii) although the CAR declines from deal to deal on average, it increases for hubrisinfected CEOs; 2 (iii) as predicted by the ADR model, TBD decreases from deal to deal but again there are differences between rational and hubris-infected CEOs.
Multivariate analyses deliver two principal results:
-(i) controlling for panel data and endogenous sample selection, while CARs decline on average during M&A programs, for hubris-infected CEOs, they increase and the difference is statistically significant. This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables and to alternate hubris proxies;
-(ii) TBD decreases from deal to deal both on average and for hubris-infected CEOs, though it is almost flat for the latter. This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables. We also uncover some interesting relations between CEO remuneration and the evolution of TBD.
The results generally support the ADR theory and its underlying learning hypothesis. In particular, the combination of a declining average CAR, an increasing CAR for hubris-infected CEOs, and a declining average TBD, are direct predictions of the theory. However, in conflict with the theory's predictions, we do not find an increasing TBD for hubris-infected CEOs. But the nearly flat TBD trend for these CEOs and its statistically significant difference from the TBD trend for rational CEOs points in the right direction (especially considering the inherently noisy nature of hubris proxies and the errors-in-variables problem pointed out in ADR). Finally, we find an increasing CAR from deal to deal for public targets. This is incompatible with a shrinking investment opportunity set. Overall, the results suggest that average CEO behavior is characterized by learning and that the effects of learning seem to be present even when a CEO is initially infected by hubris.
The first section of the paper briefly reviews various explanations of the CAR pattern from deal to deal in M&A programs including the testable implications of the ADR theory. Section II describes our sample, variables and empirical methods. Section III is devoted to a preliminary set of univariate tests while Section IV provides multivariate tests. The final section summarizes and concludes.
I. M&A Programs and Value Creation
A. CAR Patterns during M&A Programs Schipper and Thompson (1983) Other contributions focus on CEO hubris as a key psychological factor in acquisitions.
Referencing Roll (1986) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) , Malmendier and Tate (2006) , Moeller et al. (2005) , among others, interpret the empirical evidence to indicate hubris; the evidence includes long term post acquisition under-performance, CEO option exercise patterns, and valuedestroying deals. Fuller et al (2002) , Billett and Qian (2005) , Conn et al. (2005) , Croci (2005 ), Ismail (2006 and Ahern (2006) all find a declining trend in the CAR during M&A programs.
This clear empirical regularity is also interpreted as a sign of hubris (the implicit assumption being that hubris is growing from deal to deal), except by Croci (2005) and Ahern (2006 authors posit that M&A sequences begin in response to an expansion of the investment opportunity set and end when it is finally exhausted. The CAR trend observed ex-post would therefore reflect the declining investment opportunity set rather than hubris-infected CEOs.
While the authors provide empirical support for their argument, proxies used to measure the investment opportunity set are subject to some question.
The time between successive deals (TBD) has not been investigated previously, perhaps owing to a lack of any theoretical predictions about what TBD pattern should be observed, if any. Indeed, neither the acquisition program anticipation hypothesis, nor the hubris hypothesis nor the timevarying investment opportunity set hypothesis, predict a TBD pattern during M&A programs.
So, a declining CAR in successive deals is compatible with different arguments, growing hubris and a shrinking investment opportunity, to mention only two. More specific theoretical predictions are needed to test empirically for the presence (or absence) of learning.
B. The ADR Model
In Aktas et al. (2006) 
where, V -corresponds to the target's current market value, and V + corresponds to a valuation level for which the takeover attempt will succeed with certainty but the CEO will be fired because of over-payment. In words, the CEO's reservation value increases with the risk-adjusted expected
Bids, prices, CAR and TBD. M&A operations have varied forms. Direct takeovers receive the most notoriety, but they represent only a fraction of all acquisitions (see Andrade et al., 2001) This implies that a higher acquisition price for a given level of synergies will result in a lower fraction of synergies being accrued by the acquirer:
On the other hand, a higher acquisition price brings a higher probability of success and, for a given number of transaction attempts by period, a lower TBD:
Empirical implications. Equations (4) and (5) allow ADR to derive a rich set of empirical predictions about the implications of learning during M&A programs. These are summarized in Figure 1 . Panel A presents the results for rational CEOs. As learning progresses, rational CEOs improve their ability to forecast potential synergies. Consequently, they bid more aggressively with each successive deal, increasing the offering price. This increases the probability of doing deals (so TBD decreases) and increases the fraction of value creation conceded to target shareholders (so the acquirer's CAR also decreases) 6 . These predictions depend on CEO risk aversion: more confidence about future synergies brings higher valuations.
Since 
II. Data and Empirical Methods

A. Sample Constitution
To understand CEO behavior during M&A programs, we need to follow their successive To identify M&A operations undertaken by these CEOs, we rely on the Thomson SDC database.
Since we want to control for an acquisition program effect (more on this in Section II.B), we collect deals beginning in 1990. Our deal selection criteria are as follows: US listed acquirers, all targets (US and non-US, listed and non-listed), completed deals and percentage of shares held before the deal less than 50%. To ease the comparison of our results with previously published ones, we present two samples: the 'Full Sample', which includes all deals of at least one million dollars, and the 'Big Sample', which is restricted to deals larger than one hundred million dollars.
The 'Full Sample' essentially mimics that used by Moeller et al. (2005) and it includes 28,662 deals. The 'Big Sample' includes 6,108 deals and is closer to Fuller et al. (2002) or Billett and Qian (2005) . Schipper and Thompson, 1983) . Our M&A decision history reconstruction possibly misses some deals since the Thomson SDC coverage is extensive but perhaps not exhaustive.
We complement information provided by Compustat ExecuComp and Thomson SDC using the CRSP and Compustat databases. Data availability limits our final sample sizes, depending on the control variables used in various tests. We therefore systematically report the exact number of observations in each computation. We also have used data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Ownership Reporting System to track acquirers that undertook insider trading.
B. Variable Definitions
Our main dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 7 observed around the acquisition announcement date and the time between successive deals (TBD). 8 To compute the CAR, daily abnormal returns are computed as in Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004;  2005) using the Beta-one model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return from the daily return of each company. We use the daily equal weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market portfolio. The standard market model (or any model that requires coefficient estimation) could be problematic due to repetitive acquisitions and concomitant overlapping observations. The eventwindow goes from day minus five to day plus five relative to the announcement date (the Thomson SDC announcement dates are known to be somewhat imprecise, which suggests that the event window should not be too narrow). To form a cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, we use equal weighting. It has been feasible to compute the CAR for 25,845 out of the 28,662
7 ADR model also delivers predictions about bids and prices, so it would be interesting to investigate their determinants too. But data availability constraints would drastically reduce the sample sizes. 8 For the first deal, TBD is the time between the CEO hiring date and the first deal announcement date. deals in the Full Sample. The average CAR is 1.6% (t-stat of 18.6) and its median is 0.5%.
These results are compatible with recent papers focusing on exhaustive M&A samples (see Moeller et al., 2004) .
For multivariate analyses, the main independent variable is the deal sequence number (SEQ), whose coefficient measures the time slope of the CAR or TBD during the M&A program.
The existing literature suggests the inclusion of three categories of control variables. A brief summary follows and a detailed description can be found in the Appendix.
-CEO specific: the hiring and departure dates determine the activity period. Compustat
ExecuComp provides CEO remuneration variables (annual base salary, the variable component of salary relative to the base salary, share holdings). These are important as controls because CEO remuneration is known to influence acquisition decisions (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Datta et al., 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004) . Age and gender might be related to CEO risk aversion and but are frankly included out of sheer curiosity.
-Deal specific: the announcement date (from Thomson SDC), the deal size (see among many others Moeller et al. (2005) ), the percentage acquired and the toehold (Schwert, 2000; Betton and Eckbo, 2000) , the payment method (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987; Hansen, 1987; Martin, 1996; Faccio and Masulis, 2005) , the attitude (hostile versus friendly deals, as reported by Thomson SDC) and the number of bidders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) , the strategic fit between the bidder and the target (Servaes, 1996) , the target's private/public status (Fuller et al., 2002) and a proxy for the target's size (based on the percentage acquired and the deal size).
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-Firm specific: following previous research, these are bidder characteristics, including the bidder's past performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) , market anticipation effects (Palepu, 1986) , the acquisition program effect (see a.o. Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Malatesta and Thompson, 1985) , several variables to control for industry determinants, including the sector concentration, the number and value of transactions in the industry (see, e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Harford, 2005) , the extent of the acquirer's diversification (using information provided by the Compustat Segment database), the acquirer's size (Moeller et al., 2004) and several acquirer financial ratios (cash-flow/total assets, leverage, free cash-flow, growth of assets, growth of sales, liquidity, market to book, price-earning, return on equity and Tobin's q).
Since most targets are not listed, target controls are rather limited.
C. Methods
Econometric details will be described in Section III (univariate analyses) and Section IV (multivariate analyses). However, it is useful at this point to explain some generic choices underlying the empirical work.
C.1. Timing
Determinants of CEO behavior (base salary, variable component of the salary,…) are updated to their values at the end of the year before each acquisition; their evolution could be due (at least partially) to the succession of deals (Datta et al., 2001; Rosen, 2004) . Firm specific financial ratios and industry determinants are all calculated at the end of the year before the acquisition announcement (to avoid any feedback effects.)
C.2. Industry Classification
Instead of using SIC industry codes, which are subject to considerable criticism (see Kahle and Walkling,1996) , we employ the 48 Fama-French classifications, exploiting the SIC to Industry
Codes conversion table provided on Ken French' Web site 10 and historical SIC codes provided in the CRSP Database. This brings some balance among the number of industries, the number of firms within each industry and the homogeneity of intra-industry economic activity. These are important concerns when controlling for industry related determinants of market reactions to M&A announcements.
C.3. Hubris Proxy
Variable Definition. Finding a robust proxy for hubris is a real challenge. Because our empirical investigation is based on the ADR model, a good proxy should be close to the definition of hubris adopted in that model, which is a cognitive bias, leading either to over-optimism or overconfidence. The most direct consequence is over-bidding, leading in extreme cases to value 10 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
destruction for the bidder shareholders at deal announcement. Our hubris proxy is based on this implication. Previous research, however (see Fuller et al. (2002) has found that a major determinant of the acquirer's CAR is the target's status, public versus private. Consequently the CARs of firms acquiring public targets cannot be directly compared to the CARs of firms acquiring private targets. The hubris proxy must control for this effect. So, our proxy, called the hubris index hereafter, is obtained using the following procedure:
-for each CEO, the CAR is computed at the announcement of their first deal;
-CEOs are split into two sub-samples, depending on the status of the target, public versus private, in their first acquisition; N pub and N priv are the numbers of CEOs in the public target sub-sample and the private target sub-sample, respectively;
-for each sub-sample, CEOs are ranked in decreasing order by the first deal CAR (r i denotes the rank of the ith CEO);
-the hubris proxy, h i , is then the CEO rank divided by the total number of CEOs in the subsample; i.e.,
The higher h i , the lower the value of the CEO's first deal, hence the more likely the CEO is infected by hubris. While indirect and noisy, this proxy has several advantages. It is directly motivated by the ADR model. Since it is based on ranks, it is robust to outliers. Being computed by sub-samples of target status, it controls for that important determinant of acquirers' CAR.
Let us also note that: -When the 'Full Sample' is split between rational and hubris-infected CEOs (mainly for univariate analyses), we define a dummy variable taking the value 1.0 if h i is above 0.75. The 0.75 threshold is chosen to assure that CEOs classified as hubris-infected actually destroyed value in their first deal (they experienced a negative CAR).
-Since the first deal CAR is used to determine h i (or its dummy version), that CAR is excluded from other calculations. For example, trends in CAR and TBD start from the second deal (see Section III).
Empirical Validation. The hubris index plays a key role in testing the ADR model's implications and its underlying learning hypothesis. In an attempt to investigate whether this proxy is effectively correlated with CEO over-confidence and/or over-optimism, we have analyzed their insider trading activities. (Doukas and Petmezas (forthcoming European Financial Management) follow a comparable strategy using UK data.)
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Ownership Reporting System (ORS) contains corporate insider purchases and sales. On SEC Form 4, the ORS system includes security transactions by persons with beneficial ownership, primarily officers, directors and principal stockholders of a corporation. Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), the following records were discarded: duplicated, amended, with no price information, with a recorded date preceding the transaction date, with a recorded date 31 days (or more) after the due date. We then identified acquirers that undertook insider trades during the three months preceding the announcement date of the first deal in an M&A program. The ORS database does not identify the insider trading but only the firm within which he is working. However the ORS database provides a classification: top executives, officers and directors. Out of our 1424 CEO-firms that made at least one acquisition during the period 1992-2002 (our full-sample), we have been able to identify 465 firms from with insiders who traded during the three months preceding the first deal announcement.
The results are as follows. For firms managed by CEOs classified as rational by the dummy variable version of our hubris index, the average net number of trades (buys minus sells) by insiders in the 3-month preceding the first deal announcement is -1.5 (or -$9,266,596 in sale proceeds on average.) For firms managed by CEOs classified as hubris-infected, the average net number of trades is -1.12 (-$2,873,690 in average sale proceeds.) For top executives only, the corresponding numbers are -0.29 by insiders of firms managed by rational CEOs (-$5,990,265) and -0.20 by insiders of firms managed by hubris-infected CEOs (-$1,453,174.) Probably for diversification reasons, insiders are on average net sellers (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005) . The ratio of rational CEOs' net trades to hubris-infected CEOs' net trades is 1.34 (-1.5/-1.12). In sales proceeds, the ratio is 3.32 (-$9,266,596/-$2,873.690). Insiders of firms managed by hubris-infected CEOs sell considerably less than their counterparts from firms managed by rational CEOs. Limiting attention to top executives activities only, the results are even stronger; the number of trades ratio is 1.46 (-0.29/-0.20) and the sales proceeds ratio is 4.12 (-5,990,265/-1,453,174) . Hence, the hubris index seems to capture a real difference in perceived future prospects by insiders and the effect is more pronounced for insiders close to the CEO.
Although hubris-infected CEOs by construction (of the index) destroy value at the first acquisition, insiders of their firms are more bullish. 
C.4. Financial Ratios, Outliers and Statistical Tests
Financial ratios frequently exhibit large outliers (especially when the book value of equities is the denominator). Moreover, controlling for industry is often essential (e.g., for debt and leverage ratios -see MacKay and Phillips (2005) ). To mitigate these potential difficulties, we discard any ratio whose denominator is a negative book value of equities and any ratio more than two standard deviations from the mean. In the multivariate analyses, we use industry median adjusted values.
All reported p-values are from a bootstrap procedure. We use a percentile-t approach, based on case by case resampling (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) , which is known to converge fast (Horowitz, 2002) and should perform well in small sub-samples.
C.5. The Acquisition Program Effect
Schipper and Thomson (1983) found that initial announcements of acquisition programs generate higher CARs then successive deal announcements; hence, we control for an acquisition program effect by including a dummy variable taking the value 1.0 if no deal has been announced by the firm in the two previous years.
III. Univariate Analyses
Our univariate analyses are presented in two tables. Table 3 focuses on the evolution of bidder (CEO and firm) and deal characteristics through M&A programs. Table 4 is dedicated to the CAR and TBD.
11 The univariate analysis extends through as many as seven acquisitions. This provides conformity with the later multivariate analyses (Section IV). As shown in Table 2 , sample sizes become quite small after seven acquisitions and are insufficient for most multivariate tests. When interpreting univariate results, one should be mindful of the crosssectional and the time series dimensions of the observations. For example, a negative trend in a 11 To miminize the impact of outliers, Table 4 reports median values of CAR and TBD from deal to deal; Though it turns out that sample means have similar patterns (not reported.)
given ratio from deal to deal might be due to a general trend characterizing all CEOs or to a difference between CEOs doing few and many deals (or to both). The issue is resolved with the panel data analyses in Section IV.
To summarize the key results succinctly, we report the slope coefficient of each variable calculated in a pooled regression of the variable on the deal sequence number (SEQ). This slope coefficients measures the average linear trend through a succession of deals.
A. Bidder and Deal Characteristics from Deal to Deal
Table 3 -Panel A shows that CEO base salary increases significantly from deal to deal (a result also reported by Datta et al. (2001) and Rosen (2004) ). This is, perhaps, simply the usual relation between CEO salary and firm size but it might also reveal that CEOs who survive to consummate more deals have done more successful deals and are rewarded. There is no significant increase in the CEOs variable compensation components (Interest and Holding). But since these are scaled either by total compensation or by company size there could still be a significant increase in the dollar value of variable remuneration. Industry concentration measures do not display a systematic trend. The number and value of deals done in the bidder's industry increase. This might be due to the late-1990s merger wave. Later deals, (higher SEQs), are more likely to have taken place later in the sample. The acquirer segment concentrations decrease and the number of segments increases, which clearly indicates that repetitive acquirers tend to diversify their activities. The increase in total assets is intuitively plausible. The asset and sales based growth rates indicate that size increases at an increasing rate but the effect is only marginally significant for sales. Understandably, acquirer liquidity decreases; evidently, purchasing targets uses up some current assets such as cash. Table 3 , Panel B describes the evolution of deal features. The percentage acquired increases significantly (from 89% to more than 95%) and so does the deal size, almost doubling on average. This is consistent with learning: CEOs could begin with smaller deals to learn the basics and then, when feeling more knowledgeable, they might risk bigger acquisitions (a practice stressed in the management literature (Harding and Rovit, 2004) . The number of rivals significantly decreases:
CEOs seems to be more and more able to deter competition (or else bigger deals attract fewer competitors); the effect is statistically significant but very small.
B. Acquirer CAR from Deal to Deal
The four left-most columns of Are the CAR slopes different between rational and hubris-infected CEOs? Panel C of Table 4 explores this issue. For rational CEOs, the slope is negative and clearly significant. For hubrisinfected CEOs, the slope is positive but not significantly different from zero. Recall that the ADR model predicts a negative slope for rational CEOs and positive slope for hubris-infected
CEOs. Given the noisy hubris proxy, this result is somewhat supportive. Remember too that the first deal in the sequence is not included in this comparison. Is the difference of slopes significant? Is it robust to the inclusion of control variables and potential sample selection biases?
The multivariate analyses in Section IV will offer an answer these questions.
C. TBD, the time between deals
The right-most columns of Table 4 present -the TBD decrease for rational CEOs supports directly the learning hypothesis;
-the difference of slopes between rational CEOs and hubris-infected CEOs may or may not provide indirect support for the learning hypothesis, depending on its statistical significance.
We test this further in Section IV.
D. Listed Target CARs
Listed targets are included in the data sample, so their CARs can be tracked from deal to deal.
However, during a succession of acquisitions, a given acquirer typically mixes private and public targets, so there are gaps in the observable deal sequence targets. Keeping this limitation in mind, target CARs do not decline (middle columns of Table 4 , Panels A and B). This offers little support to the idea that the acquirers' decreasing CAR is driven by a shrinking investment opportunity set.
From the results thus far, it appears that the 'Full Sample' and the 'Big Sample' are comparable.
Consequently, for parsimony we present henceforth only results for the 'Full Sample', which has the advantage of larger sample sizes. Also, since initially doing small deals may be a way to learn, excluding them might results in the loss of pertinent information.
IV. Multivariate Analyses
This section analyses multiple determinants of the CAR and the TBD, emphasizing the role of the deal sequence number.
A. The CAR from Deal to Deal
A.1. Econometric Methods
A multivariate explanation of the CAR raises several econometric challenges. CARs are quite noisy (the typical R 2 of CAR regressions range from less than 1% to 6 or 7% (see, e.g., Moeller et al., 2005) . One must also consider the panel structure of the data and the potential endogenous sample selection biases pointed out in Section I.B. Panels A to C of Table 5 progressively tackle these problems.
Panel A of Table 5 presents a simple regression of the CAR on the deal sequence number; Panel B, after having conducted a Hausman specification test (the results of which are reported at the end of the Panel), presents corresponding results using a fixed panel data estimator; Panel C controls for both panel data and for the potential sample selection biases using a two-step Probit to construct an instrument for the probability of being included in the sample. The Probit model is used only to control for endogenous sample selection, so it's specification is not interesting in itself. The objective is to construct an instrument that is highly correlated with the probability of being included in the sample. 13 The Probit model is re-estimated from deal to deal. The probability of inclusion is then used to compute the Heckman lambda, which is included in the CAR regression. The CAR regression is calculated after first differencing in order to obtain the fixed effects estimator.
A.2. Results
The Panel A results conflict with the previously-reported univariate CAR results (see Table 4 -notice also that, in Panel C, the Heckman Lambda variable, which controls for the potential sample attrition bias, is not significant. Endogenous sample selection seems not to be a major concern here (except for the deal sequence number's significance). One possibility is that the winner's curse and survival biases 14 cancel each other out. Finally, we do not think it's necessary to control for endogenous sample selection biases when studying TBD. While the CAR is determined in a market process involving investors, potentially leading to endogenous sample attrition, TBD depends entirely on CEO decisions, so there is little reason to suspect endogeneity.
B.2. Results
15 We used the ExpEnd Gauss program for non-linear GMM Estimation of Exponential models (see Romeu, 2004.) 16 The Poisson estimator is most frequently used in count data models. It relies on an assumption that the expected number of counts is equal to the variance of the number of counts. When the variance is higher than the expectation, the econometric literature speaks about over-dispersion. Using a negative binomial model is a way to check for over-dispersion. Tobin's q -Industry adjusted is significant in both panels but changes sign. In Panel A, which relies on the cross-section only, the coefficient is positive: higher growth opportunities are associated with slower acquisitions. However, the time series of the acquirer behavior in Panel B brings a sign reversal. One possible explanation is that Tobin's q proxies for past performance of the firm. The negative sign might indicate that a good past performance tempts a CEO to accelerate further acquisitions.
Two variables are significant using the fixed effects estimator (Panel B) and not the pooled estimator (Panel A): Leverage -Industry adjusted and Private Target. Since they are only significant when using the time-series property of the data, they probably reveal something specific about the dynamics of CEO decisions. In particular, it seems quite plausible that an increase in leverage would reduce the speed at which CEOs are willing engage in takeovers. The positive coefficient for Private Target is less intuitive. Since public targets are better known, perhaps there is more competition among acquirers, thus hastening takeover decisions. Perhaps
CEOs have more leisure to consider private targets since other firms might be unaware of the potential synergies.
Differences between rational CEOs and hubris-infected CEOs are explored in Panels C and D of Table 6 , using the same method as in Table 5 , (GMM estimation to accommodate panel data.)
The only difference between Panels C and Panel D is the exclusion of the Salary and Interest control variables in the latter.
Panel C shows that, for rational CEOs, the deal sequence number is negative and significant. The cross-product variable is positive and significant with both Hubris specifications. Hubris-infected CEOs accelerate less than rational CEOs during the M&A program implementation. But, in absolute value, the coefficient of the cross-product variable is significantly lower than the coefficient of the Deal sequence number variable. Consequently, these results offer only partial support for the ADR model's predictions: there is indeed a behavioral difference between rational and hubris-infected CEOs but the difference is not large enough to generate an increasing TBD trend among hubris-infected CEOs. Again, however, one might consider the influence of measurement error in the hubris index, as discussed in Section I.B. By construction, the "rational" CEOs sub-sample likely includes some who are hubris-infected, those who overbid in their first acquisition and are disappointed by the resulting synergies, which are nonetheless large enough to deliver a positive CAR. Given this unavoidable problem, partial empirical support of the ADR predictions about TBD is not all that surprising.
Panel D of Table 6 uncovers an interesting interaction between CEO remuneration and CEO learning. Removing the CEO compensation variables Salary and Interest increases the coefficient of Deal sequence number X Hubris and reduces the coefficient of the Deal sequence number alone, so that they become roughly comparable in magnitude. In words, the TBD trend becomes almost flat for hubris-infected CEOs. This result suggests a potential interaction between a CEO's learning and his remuneration contract (see Rosen, 2004) . Since the effect of learning (a reduced TBD slope for hubris-infected CEOs) seems to be more pronounced when there is no control for remuneration, learning may be partly driven by the CEO's wage contract incentives. Such a tentative interpretation clearly deserves further investigation.
V. Conclusion
Toward Is there an alternative explanation of the unambiguous empirical evidence? Aktas et al. (2006) (ADR) model the CEO M&A decision making process theoretically. Combining rationality, hubris, and learning, they reach several testable conclusions. If rational CEOs are learning, which seems plausible, they become more aggressive with experience in bidding. Consequently, in successive acquisitions, they concede an ever larger fraction of synergies to target shareholders;
this implies that bidder CARs should decline from deal to deal. Hubris-infected CEOs, however, receiving negative feedback from investors about their excessive previous bids, become more cautious. This suggests an increasing trend in their CARs from deal to deal. As rational CEOs become more aggressive in bidding, the probability of takeover success increases and the elapsed time between acquisitions decreases. The reverse should be expected for hubris-infected CEOs.
Using information provided by Compustat ExecuComp, we study the behavior of 2,589
individual -endogenous sample selection biases can be controlled with a two-step Heckman procedure but they do not appear to represent a material problem since the results are similar to those obtained with simpler methods.
-on average, the interval between successive acquisitions declines over time, as predicted by the ADR model for rational CEOs who learn. This pattern is more pronounced for rational CEOs than for hubris-infected CEOs and the difference is statistically significant. Taking into account the noisy nature of any hubris proxy including the one use in this paper (an errors-invariable issue pointed out in Aktas et al. (2006) ), we feel it reasonable to conclude that hubrisinfected CEOs also learn, but at a slower pace.
Variable Description Panel A. Key variables
CAR
Bidder's announcement 11-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated using the Beta-one model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return (equal weighted CRSP index) from the daily return of the bidder.
TBD
For the first deal, the Time Between successive Deals is number of months between the CEO hiring date and the first acquisition announcement date. For subsequent deals, it is the number of months between successive acquisitions.
SEQ
The deal sequence number in the M&A program for a given CEO-firm couple.
Hubris Score -Rank It corresponds to the hubris proxy (h i ) computed using the rank method described in Section II.C.3. The higher h i , the more likely the CEO is hubris-infected.
Hubris Score -25% It corresponds to the dummy version of the hubris proxy; one if the hubris proxy h i is above 0.75, and zero otherwise.
Lambda
It corresponds to the Heckman lambda, obtained from a Probit model of the probability of being included in the CEO-firm sample.
Panel B. CEO characteristics (Source: ExecuComp) Salary
The dollar value of the base salary earned by the CEO during the fiscal year.
Interest
The variable component of CEO compensation. It corresponds to the sum of the aggregate value of stock options (BLK_VALUE) and the value of restricted stock (RSTKGRNT) granted to the CEO, divided by total compensation (TDC2).
Holding
The aggregate number of shares held by the CEO as a % of the total shares outstanding.
Age
The age of the CEO at the hiring date.
Gender
Dummy variable: 1 for male CEOs, and 0 for female CEOs.
Panel C. Firm characteristics (Sources: CRSP, Compustat, Compustat Segment Database and ExecuComp)
Long Term Past CAR 24-month cumulative abnormal return (from month -27 to month -4, relative to the announcement date).
Segment Concentration
Concentration of activities computed using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on sales repartition by activity segments.
Number of Segments
The number of activity segments reported in the Compustat Segment database.
Total Assets Log of book value of total assets (item 6).
Cash Flow Income before extraordinary items (item 18)+depreciation and amortization (item 14), scaled by the book value of total assets (item 6).
Free Cash Flow
Operating income before depreciation (item 13)-interest expense (item 15)-income taxes (item 16)-capital expenditures (item 128), scaled by the book value of total assets (item 6).
Asset Based Growth Rate Total Assets at the end of year t-1 minus Total Assets at the end of year t-2, scaled by the Total Assets at the end of year t-2.
Sales Based Growth Rate Sales at the end of year t-1 minus Sales at the end of year t-2, scaled by the Sales at the end of year t-2.
Leverage Book value of debt (item 34+item 9) over market value of total assets (item 6-item 60+(item 25*Item 199)).
Liquidity Current assets (item 4)-current liabilities (item 5), scaled by the book value of total assets (item6).
Market to Book Market value of equity (item 24*item 25) divided by the book value of total common equity (item 60).
Price Earning
Closing stock price at the end of the fiscal year (item 199) over earnings per share (item 58).
ROE
Return on equity, which corresponds to the adjusted income before extraordinary items (item 20) over book value of total common equity (item 60).
Tobin's q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item 6-item 60+item 25*item 199)/item 6.
Market Value
Number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price one month prior to the announcement date.
Acquisition Program Dummy variable: 1 for a Bidder having made no acquisitions in the past previous 24 months, 0 otherwise.
Runup
Bidder's 30-day cumulative abnormal return during the period (-35,-6) , relative to the announcement date.
Number of deals already done by the firm
The number of acquisitions done by the firm in the 2-year period preceding the CEO hiring date.
Panel D. Bidder's industry characteristics using the 48 Fama-French industry classifications
Industry Assets Based HHI Industry Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index using total assets (item 6). The HHI is computed using all COMPUSTAT firms in the industry with valid data on total assets (item 6). Industry Market Value Based HHI Industry Herfindhal Index using market value of equities.
Industry Sales Based HHI Industry Herfindhal Index using total sales. Industry Number of Deals (year -1)
The number of deals in the bidder's industry the year before the deal announcement. 
